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DERIVATIVE LIABILITY IN SECURITIES LAW:
CONTROLLING PERSON LIABILITY,
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, AND AIDING
AND ABETTING
RALPH C. FERRARA*
DIANE SANGER**

As with many areas of securities law, the issue of vicarious or
derivative liability blends together a number of related statutory and common law elements. Although the various elements are related closely, this
relationship has not contributed to the coherence of the principles applied.
This article, therefore, seeks to provide an overview of the manner in
which judicial and administrative decisions have balanced Congressional
intent with the common law in the areas of controlling person liability,
respondeat superior, and liability for aiding and abetting.
I.

STATUTORY LIABILITY OF CONTROLLING PERSONS

Dating to their original enactment, the Securities Act of 19331 (1933
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (1934 Act) have included
provisions imposing liability on persons who were not the primary actors
in an illegal course of conduct, but who stood in a control relationship
to the primary actor.3 Section 15 of the 1933 Act provides that persons
in a control relationship with persons liable under section 11 or 12, will
be liable if the controlling person had knowledge or reason to believe in
the existence of the facts constituting the violation. 4 Section 20(a) of the
* Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York, New York (Washington, D.C. office);
J.D. 1970, University of Cincinnati; LL.M. 1972, George Washington University.
** Special Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Securities Exchange Commission.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for
any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the authors'
colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
1 15 U.S.C. SS 77a-77bbbb (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1976).
1 See infra note 4. The principle of control may serve as the basis of secondary liability
under other provisions of the securities laws. See, e.g., Investment Company Act, 5 48a),
15 U.S.C. S 80a-47(a)(1976) (unlawful for any person directly or indirectly to cause to be
done any acts which would be unlawful for such person to do under Act); see also Jerozal
v. Cash Reserve Management, Inc., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,019, at 94,826 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
' See 15 U.S.C. S 770 (1976). Section 15 provides liability for any person:
who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to
or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other
persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under section 11, or 12 ....
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1934 Act provides liability for any controlling person unless that controlling person acted in good faith and did not induce the violation.'
As enacted in 1934, section 15 contained no defense to liability.' The
concept of controlling persons originated in the Senate version of what
became the 1933 Act. The Senate bill contained the so-called "dummy provision" in which the Senate intended to prevent directors from evading
liability for signing a registration statement by such means as appointing
"dummy" directors who actually serve on the board. The House bill contained no similar provisions.' The Conference Committee report described
the Senate bill provisions as designed to make liability dependent upon
the actual control exercised by one party over another irrespective of
a direct agency relationship.' The Conference report stated that the Senate
provisions were merged into one and incorporated as a new section."
When originally introduced, both the House and Senate bills, which
were the principal vehicles leading to the enactment of the 1934 Act, also
included provisions imposing liability on controlling persons without providing any defense.1 Revised versions of these bills introduced one and
two months later included the good faith defense which Congress ultimately enacted. 2 The Committee reports accompanying these bills did not explain the reason for, or intended effect of, the proposed addition. 3 In
response to criticism on the House floor that the concept of control was
too vague, however, one Congressman stated that the object of the proviId.
Section 11 of the 1933 Act generally imposes civil liability for false or misleading
statements in a registration statement. Id. § 77k. Section 12 of the 1933 Act, generally
imposes civil liability for the offer or sale of a security in violation of the registration and
prospectus delivery requirements of § 5 of the Act, or by means of a false or misleading
prospectus or oral communication. See id. §§771, 772.
Since secondary liability under S 15 is limited to violations of 5 11 and § 12 of the
1933 Act, the majority of cases brought in this area allege violations of S 20(a) of the 1934
Act, which includes secondary liability for violations of the broad antifraud provisions of
5 10(b) and rule 10b-5. See id. § 78t.
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976). The Sixth Circuit has held that the SEC may not rely
on S 20(a) in an injunctive enforcement action, but must rely on S 20(b), because the SEC
is not a person to whom § 20(a)'s remedy runs. See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). But see SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). The authority of the Sixth Circuit's position is subject to question in view of the
1975 amendment of the statutory definition of "person" in S 3(a)(9) to include a government
or government subdivision, agency or instrumentality. See Securities Act Amendments of
1975, 89 Stat. 97, S 3(2) (June 4, 1975).
6 See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, S 15, 48 Stat. 84 (1934) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. S 77o (1976)).
' S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(k), 4, 13 (1933); see S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1933).
H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
H.R. CONF. REP. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
10 Id.

11See S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
12 See S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
13 See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
26 (1934).
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sion was to catch the man who stands behind the scenes and controls the
man who is in a nominal position of authority."
At the time of the adoption of the 1934 Act, Congress also amended
the 1933 Act, including the addition of the "no knowledge" or "reasonable
ground" defense to section 15."5 Congress intended this change to carry
out more accurately the real purpose of section 15 by restricting the scope
of the section. The mere existence of control is not a basis for liability
unless that control is exercised effectively to bring about the action upon
which liability is based." This correction of section 15 and the addition
of the defense to section 20(a) were only two responses to the tremendous
criticism and industry lobbying campaign that the proposed 1934 Act
inspired. 7
A. Definition of Controlling Person
The threshold question in interpreting section 15 and 20(a) is in determining who is a controlling person. Section 15 refers to every person who
controls by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, whereas
section 20(a) speaks of every person who controls directly or indirectly.
Notwithstanding these differences in language, it frequently is acknowledged that section 20(a) was modeled on section 15, and courts have tended
to interpret these sections analogously. 8 While both statutes define "person" broadly to include an individual, an organization, or a group, Congress declined to define the term "control", apparently concluding that
the concept of control must remain flexible. 9 Consistent with this intent,
the courts have construed "control" broadly' and have imposed few limita" See 77 CONG. REC. 8306 (1934). Congressman Lea stated that the man charged with
control would be liable only to the extent the controlling person did control the action complained of. Id.
"5 Pub. L. No. 291, § 208, 48 Stat. 908 (1934).
16H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
17 See 77 CONG.REC. 8924 (1934). Upon beginning hearings on the revised House bill, Congressman Rayburn noted that in the new draft the Committee had tried to meet the legitimate
criticism to which the prior draft had been subjected. Stock Exchange RegulationHearings,
House Commiftee on Interstateand ForeignCommerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 625 (1934) (remarks
of Chairman Rayburn). Similarly, upon offering the proposed amendments to the 1933 Act
as Title II to the 1934 Act bill on the Senate floor, Senator Fletcher, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, stated that the purpose of the amendment was to
clarify and liberalize the Securities Act and to relieve the Act of some ambiguities. 77 CONG.
REC. 8924 (1934).
",See, e.g., Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 673 (5th Cir. 1980); Paul F. Newton & Co.
v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Management Dynamics,
Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975).
19 See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The House report accompanying
the 1934 Act states that the term "control" is intended to include actual control and legally
enforceable control. The House report, although not defining the term, lists as examples
of methods of control used, stock ownership, lease, contract and agency. Id.
I A number of courts have looked for guidance to, without necessarily relying upon,
the definition of "control" promulgated by the SEC for purposes of certain reports required
to be filed under the 1934 Act. See 17 C.F.R. S 240.12b-2(f) (1982).
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tions on the categories of persons who may meet the standard of controlling
person status in particular fact situations.2
Based on the case law, difficulty exists in defining the entire class
of persons who may be controlling persons. Some commentators have
observed that the courts have applied two distinct standards of control.'
According to these authorities, some courts have found "control by status"
based primarily on the person's position of control within an organization, with little regard to the exercise of control. Other courts have required a showing of both a certain status and the exercise of control by
the controlling person. In many cases, however, the analysis of this issue
is not articulated fully, and the distinction between matters relevant to
who is a controlling person and to whether the controlling person has
established a defense to liability may not be drawn clearly.' The better
reasoned cases separate the issue of control from the issue of whether
the defendant's conduct meets the statutory defense. These cases treat
the issue of control as a question of fact to be determined on the basis
of all the circumstances.
For purposes of establishing who is a controlling person, it should
not be necessary that the controlling person actually exercised control
over the particular transaction giving rise to the violation.' In the majority
of cases, the courts have given heavy consideration to the power or potential power to influence and control the activities of a person, as opposed
to the actual exercise of power,' and one may be a controlling person
even if one has only some indirect means of discipline or influence short
21 Courts have held, however, that a national securities exchange cannot be liable as
a "controlling person." See, e.g., Carr v. Nyse, 414 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1976).

2'See, e.g., Marshall, Control PersonLiability, 13 REV. SEc. REG. 927 (1980); Johnston,

Vicarious Liability of ControllingPersons Under the Securities Acts, 11 LoY. L.A.L. REV.
151 (1977); Note, Liability of CorporateDirectorsas "Controlling Persons" Under Section
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 437 (1978-79); Note, Liability of ControllingPersons-Common Law and Statutory Theories of SecondaryLiability, 24 DRAKE L.
REV. 621, 630-31 (1975); Note, The Burden of Control:DerivativeLiability Under Section 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1019 (1973).
2 See, e.g., Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), affd per curiam,
422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970). Some cases frequently cited as evidence of the "control by status"
doctrine, when read as a whole, do not support clearly the dichotomy. See, e.g., Harriman
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 104-05 (D. Del. 1974) (finding allegation
of status that involves potential for control sufficient to state cause of action since participation of defendant in alleged violations is relevant only to controlling person's defense);
Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. at 439 (following discussions of specific involvement
of defendants in operations of company, concluding that persons who act as directors are
in control of corporation); but see SEC v. First See. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.) (finding securities
firm liable, inter alia, as controlling person of president and owner of 92% of corporation's stock), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972). See also Camrose Inc. v. Intervester U.S. Real
Estate Fund, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,469 at 99,376 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
24 See, e.g., Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818,
823-24 (Efl. Wis. 1977).
1 See Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 528, 538
(D. Md. 1978); Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976).
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of actual direction over the controlled person."
While a great many cases alleging control person liability have arisen
in the context of an employer-employee relationship," general agreement
exists among the courts that the means of control need not derive from
traditional employer-employee, principal-agent or master-servant29
relationships,' or even from stock ownership of the controlled person.
The means of control may arise through business relationships other than
stock ownership, through interlocking directorates, family relationships,
and through a myriad of other factors. In addition, the controlling person
need not be the only person or entity with direct means of discipline or
influence."
Thus, a brokerage firm may be liable for securities violations of an
investment adviser placed on the firm's approved list." As a controlling
person of the corporation, an officer or director may be liable for acts
of other corporate agents.2 In addition, the intended beneficiary of stock
purchases may be liable for securities violations committed by the person
purchasing stock on his behalf.
B.

Defense to Controlling Person Liability

Although the courts' liberal construction of control encompasses a
broad spectrum of defendants, controlling persons still may avoid secondary liability by meeting the defenses provided in sections 15 and 20(a).
To meet the statutory defense provided by section 15, the controlling per" See SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F2d 981, 987 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 41-42 (10th Cir. 1971); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
See, e.g., Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 884 (7th Cir.) (brokerage firm for
registered representative), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,
649 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1981) (accounting firm for its accountants), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
938 (1982); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 639 F.2d 705, 712 (2d Cir.)
(brokerage firm for registered representative), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1011 (1980); Zweig v.
Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir.) (newspaper published for financial columnist),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). But see Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 588 F.2d
665, 669 (9th Cir. 1978) (brokerage firm did not control account executive in his capacity
as guardian of estate); Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d at 891 (finding president
controlling person of company and rejecting argument that company was controlling person because president and company cannot simultaneously be controlling persons as to each
other); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (corporation for its director); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d at 41 (corporation for agent hired to develop company in another state).
' See Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, Carpenter v. Edwards & Warren, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
See Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 105 (D. Del. 1974).
30Id.
-' See Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 528, 538-39
(D. Md. 1978). But see Nelson v. Hench, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,085 at 91,906 (D. Minn. 1977).
See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co., Inc. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945,957-58 (5th Cir. 1981).
See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738-39 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
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son must show that he had no knowledge of, or reasonable ground to
believe in, the existence of the facts constituting the primary violation.
To avoid liability under section 20(a), the controlling person must show
that he acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the
acts constituting the violations. 4
As noted above, little explanation can be offered for the difference
in the language used in sections 15 and 20(a) to articulate the controlling
person's defense, even though the defense to section 15 liability was first
added by an amendment contained in the bill which Congress adopted
as the 1934 Act. In any case, court decisions appear to give little consideration to these variations in language, and tend to characterize both
provisions as good faith defenses.
C.

Good Faith Versus Knowledge

As a matter of literal interpretation, the differences between the two
provisions may not be as significant as they appear on their face, because
the concepts of knowledge and good faith may overlap to a considerable
extent and may involve similar kinds of proof. Thus, the term "good faith"
has been defined as "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge
of circumstances which ought to put the [person] on inquiry."3 This definition suggests some basis for construing the two provisions similarly.
As indicated by the earlier discussion of the legislative history of sections 15 and 20(a), Congress did not address directly the degree of culpability upon which it intended to base liability under these sections. Some
courts, in interpreting both these provisions, have looked to the legislative
history of section 11 of the 1933 Act, 7 apparently reasoning that ConMost courts hold that the defendant bears the burden of establishing these defenses.
See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co., Inc., v. Partridge, 636 F.2d at 958. Whether the burden
of showing lack of good will would fall on the plaintiff in circuits that require proof of the
defendant's "culpable participation" is unclear. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d
175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981).
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, § 208, 18 Stat. 881, 908 (1934).
See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 623 (5th ed. 1979). A more significant difference would
appear to be the inducement language present in S 20(a) but not in S 15. Little authority
exists that discusses what constitutes inducing a violation under section 20(a). But see Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d at 738 (intended beneficiary of unlawful stock purchase need not have
knowledge of agent's specific wrongdoing, only directly or indirectly induce the purchase).
Arguably, some conduct that would evidence a lack of good faith, such as the failure of
a controlling person with knowledge of wrongdoing by the controlled person to take corrective action, also could support a theory of "indirect" inducement.
In other contexts, the term inducement has referred to some causal relationship between
a person's influence on another and the acts constituting the violation. See, e.g., Fromberg,
Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1963) (patent infringement) (inducement connotes active steps knowingly taken in contrast to accidental or inadvertent action); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 9815 (5th ed. 1979). Conduct which would evidence such "direct" inducement
would approach conduct supporting an aiding and abetting theory.
' See Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); Rochez Brothers,
Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d at 885. These courts do not distinguish between the legislative
history of § 15 and that of § 11. See Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 588 F.2d at 668;
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gress would have intended that the standards adopted in that section apply
to persons attempting to evade the requirements of section 11 or section
12. These courts point out that Congress adopted the House bill's fiduciary
standard of due care, rather than the insurer's liability standard which
the Senate bill would have imposed.3 8 The significance of this legislative
history in this regard, however, is subject to question. 9
D. Majority Rule: Duty to Supervise Controls Good Faith
The majority of circuits have held that a controlling person's failure
to take precautionary measures to prevent an injury caused by the controlled person may vitiate the good faith defense. Brokerage firms have
been held to a stringent standard of good faith, and must show that they
had established, maintained, and diligently enforced a proper system of
supervision and control over their employees to make out a defense to
liability.40 This duty to supervise is supported by such public policy considerations as the fact that employees of brokerage firms face ever-present
opportunities and temptations to take advantage of clients, and that
brokerage firms, which stand to benefit from violations, are in the best
position to prevent such conduct."
On the other hand, in cases involving controlling persons other than
brokerage firms, courts have tended to apply a less rigorous test of good
faith. Generally, the test of whether the controlling person has done enough
Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d at 885; see also Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas
Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980).
See Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d at 665; Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades,
527 F.2d at 885. The Senate bill would have rendered an issuer, its directors, chief executive
officer and financial officers strictly liable for the return of any compensation paid for shares
sold by means of a materially false or misleading registration statement. See S. REP. No.
47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). The House version, while imposing strict liability on the
issuer, generally provides a due care defense to corporate directors, and to the rest of
the broader class of professionals subjected to liability under that section. See H. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933). The Conference Committee adopted the House's fiduciary
standard, along with the concept of extended liability embodied in the Conference Committee's version of the Senate's dummy provisions. See H. CONF. REP. 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27
(1933).
The argument may be made that the "no knowledge" and "reasonable guard" defense
that Congress added to S 15 in 1934 was intended to conform the scope of liability under
that section to that in § 11. But the assumption that the Congress had chosen carefully
the language used would require that a different analysis obtain in the case of § 20(a), which
contains a "good faith" defense and, in any case, creates potential liability in connection
with a wide range of primary violations of the 1934 Act. More importantly, even if applicable this legislative history really does not resolve the difficult issue of what degree
of culpability Congress intended to apply under the controlling person provisions.
See supra note 38.
' See, e.g., Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d at 1120; Henricksen
v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 884 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 438-39 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds,430 F.2d
1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
, See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1025 (1975); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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to prevent the violation depends on what he could have done under the
circumstances. 4' Thus, courts have held that the practicalities of operating
a daily newspaper dictate that, in the absence of some notice of impropriety, a newspaper publisher can rely on its reporters to discharge its requirements to report fairly and accurately, and thereby establish a good
faith defense. 3 Similarly, courts have recognized that directors cannot be
expected to exercise the kind of supervision44 over a corporate president
that brokers must exercise over salesmen.

E. Minority View: Controlling Person Liability
Depends on Culpability
In contrast, the Second and Third Circuits repeatedly have held, at
least with respect to section 20(a), that the intent of this provision is to
impose liability only on persons who are in some meaningful sense culpable
participants in the wrongdoing perpetrated by the controlled person.4 5

Under this view, liability may be based on the inaction or silence of a
controlling person only if the plaintiff shows that the inaction or silence
was deliberate and done intentionally to further the fraud. 6 However,
even under this view, it appears that brokerage firms may be liable for
failure to meet their duty to supervise. 7 Cases decided by the Fourth
and Ninth Circuits have also suggested some kind of culpability
requirement.48
As suggested above, it is unclear whether the precautionary measures
or the culpable participation standard of good faith more closely reflects
the legislative intent behind the controlling person provision. Moreover,
the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 9

42 See

G.A. Thompson & Co., Inc. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 959 (5th Cir. 1981).
See Zwieg v. Hearst, 521 F.2d at 1129.
4 See Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); see also
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 42 (10th Cir. 1971) (incumbent on corporation to adopt some
precautionary measures or internal controls in view of SEC investigation and broad authority
corporation granted agent in another state).

" See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981); Rochez Brothers
Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d at 884; Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085 (2d Cir. 1974); Lanza
v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d at 1299.
4 See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d at 185.
" See Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
99,045 at 94,979 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), app. pending, Civ. Section No. 83-7120 (2d Cir.).
" See Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, Carpenter v. Edwards & Warren, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978) (refusing to extend secondary liability for mere
inaction); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970) (controlling
person must have acted in bad faith and directly or indirectly induced conduct complained of).
19 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court dismissed an action against
an accounting firm which allegedly had aided and abetted the fraud of an employee of a
brokerage firm by negligently failing to discover the fraud in the course of its audit of
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on existing law interpreting sections 15 and 20(a), is also not certain. In
Hochfelder, the Court noted that section 15 allows recovery for negligent
conduct,' whereas section 20(a) is one of those provisions which contains
a state-of-mind condition requiring something more than negligence. 1 With
respect to section 15, this suggests that the lesser standard is the more
appropriate. With respect to section 20(a), however, the question may remain unresolved. The Court's holding may appear to require the culpable
participation standard. But since the Court did not indicate how much
more culpability than negligence is required for liability, it is possible that
the culpable participation standard imposes too high a threshold. While
the failure to supervise standard might appear to be a negligence standard which the Court would reject, a number of broker-dealer cases suggest that the failure to supervise adequately may rise to the level of
reckless conduct,52 or even participation in the violation- and therefore
may satisfy the Supreme Court's state-of-mind requirement.
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

The relevance of common law doctrines such as respondeat superior
to the federal securities laws arises from the principle that the federal
courts may look to such common law doctrines to enforce federally created
rights, where such remedies are necessary to effectuate the congressional
policy embodied in the federal statute creating those rights. As the
Supreme Court has observed with respect to the federal securities laws,
Congress generally enacted these statutes against the background of existing state law, and that merely because a plaintiff's securities claim is
based upon a federal statute does not mean that Congress intended the
entire corpus of existing law to be replaced.'
The Supreme Court has not yet considered the applicability of
respondeat superior to the federal securities laws, but the Court has approved reliance on common law agency principles, including respondeat
superior, in fashioning remedies under a wide variety of other federal
remedial statutes." In looking to these principles for guidance, however,
the firm. The Court held that proof of scienter is a necessary element of a cause of action
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, as well as under rule 10b-5. The Court reserved the issue
of whether reckless conduct may satisfy this requirment. See id. at 194 n.12.
Id. at 205-26, n.27 (1976).
"1Id. at 209 n.28 (1976).
See G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 959-60 (5th Cir. 1981); Carpenter
v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d at 388.
' See Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 885 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097
(1981); SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on
other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).
' See American Soc. of Mechanical Eng'r v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 565-66
(1982) (antitrust laws, United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958) (transportation); Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1929).
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the Court has emphasized that the imposition of liability based on common-law principles must be consistent with the Congressional intent behind
the statute."
In recent years, most of the federal courts of appeal have had occasion to consider whether the application of the principle of respondeat
superior is consistent with the purposes of the federal securities laws,
most frequently in connection with allegations of fraud under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5. In these cases, questions have been raised
as to the proper relationship between respondeat superior and section
15 of the 1933 Act and section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, the controlling person provisions.
As discussed more fully in the previous section of this article, the
controlling person provisions impose liability on a broad class of persons
who possess, through an agency relationship or otherwise, some direct
or indirect control or influence over persons who violate the securities
laws, but only if those persons fail to meet the requisite lack of knowledge
or good faith defenses provided in those provisions. By contrast, the common law doctrine of respondeat superior imposes secondary liability on
a more limited category consisting of employers or other principals for
certain wrongful acts committed by an employee or other agent, but liability will attach even though they did not intend or direct these wrongful
acts.57 Under this doctrine, an employer may be liable for a tort committed
by an employee while acting within the scope of his employment,58 or for
false or misleading representations made by an employee with actual or
apparent authority to make them.55 The doctrine, however, is not grounded
on the employer's negligence or failure to supervise, and thus such defenses
to liability as the employer's good faith or due diligence are not available.'
A.

Policy Basis for Strict Liability Under
Respondeat Superior

Historically, a variety of rationales has been advanced to support the
imposition of strict liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The principal justification is that the employer controls the acts of his
I See American Society of Mechanical Eng'r v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. at 568-69,
n.6 (1982).
' See SEAVEY, Speculations as to "RespondeatSuperior",1934 HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
433 (1934); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 431.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S219(1) (1958).
5 Id. S 257, 261 (1958).
See 3 AM. JuR. 2D Agency S 261 (1962). As a doctrine of secondary liability, respondeat
superior is conceptually distinct from common law theories of primary liability. For example, a principal may be primarily liable for the act of an agent where he intentionally causes
the act to be performed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S 212 (1958). A principal also
may be liable primarily where he is reckless in giving orders, in employing agents or in
supervising the activity of agents. Id. at § 213. In practice, however, the conceptual distinctions between respondeat superior and other principles of agency law may be difficult to apply.
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employee."' The employer hires the employee, expects to profit from his
conduct, and so should bear the burden if his conduct is wrongful. 2 Additionally, the employer places in the employee's hands the means to commit the wrong' and the employer should be given the incentive to conduct his business safely." A modern justification frequently given is that
the doctrine represents a policy determination to allocate the risk of loss
to the employer, rather than to the innocent victim of the employee's
misconduct, since the employer can absorb the monetary loss as a cost
of doing business. 5
B.

Interplay Between Controlling Person and Respondeat
Superior Doctrines

Since the scope of the controlling person provisions is clearly broad
enough to encompass the employer-employee type relation, which is the
subject of respondeat superior, the question has arisen whether the inclusion in these sections of defenses to liability reflects the Congressional
intent to supplant this common law doctrine. A majority of circuits has

taken the position that the controlling person provisions were not intended
to preempt the doctrine of respondeat superior or otherwise to constitute
the exclusive means for imposing secondary liability under the federal
securities laws.6 The rationale generally underlying this position is that,
notwithstanding any apparent ambiguities in their language or legislative
history, the controlling person provisions fundamentally were intended
"l See PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 459 (4th ed. 1971); 3 Am. JuR. 2D Agency S 261 text
at nn.1&2 (1962).
3 Am. JuR. 2D Agency § 261 at nn.1 & 2 J1962); see 53 Ame. JuR. 2D, Masterand Servant
§ 417 (1970).
" See PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 459 (4th Ed. 1971); 3 Am. JUR. 2D Agency

S 261

at

nn.1&2 (1962).
" See SEAVEY, supra note 57, at 447.
" See PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 459 (4th ed. 1971); Douglas, VicariousLiability and
Administration of Risk II, 38 YALE L.J. 720, 722 (1929); SEAVEY, supra note 57, at 450.
0 See, e.g., Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 887 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1097 (1981); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19
(5th Cir. 1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976); Kerbs v. Fall
River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 741 (10th Cir. 1974).
The authorities uniformly have interpreted the Fourth Circuit decisions to concur that
the remedies under respondeat superior and the controlling person provisions co-exist. See
Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d
1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974). However, a recent district court
opinion has interpreted the Fourth Circuit's position to be that the controlling person provisions provide an exclusive remedy. See Haynes v. Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1311-13
(E.D. Va. 1981). The district court relied on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Carpenter v.
Harris,Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F2d 388, 393 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979),
which did not address the applicability of respondeat superior, but that held that to impose
liability on a brokerage firm under the controlling person provisions, some culpable participation must be found within the firm. In the Carpentercase, however, the plaintiff sought

1018

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1007

to expand, rather than restrict, the scope of liability under the securities
laws. As discussed below, however, at least two circuits have reached
the opposite or more restrictive conclusions regarding the applicability
of respondeat superior to claims under securities laws.
Most courts which have concluded that respondeat superior has continued vitality under the securities laws have done so without providing
extensive analysis. The most complete statement in support of this conclusion has been made by the SEC.
C.

Availability of Controlling Person Defenses to

Employers Subject to Respondeat Superior
In Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,7 the SEC recently argued an amicus
curiae brief that Congress did not intend the controlling person provisions to limit the traditional responsibility of an employer for the acts
of employees, but rather intended to supplement traditional agency principles to cover certain situations in which no agency relationship existed
between the defendant and the person who performed the prohibited acts.'
In this context, the SEC argued that no inconsistency exists in Congress'
providing such persons with statutory defenses not available in the common-law employer-employee context. But to permit an employer to assert
these statutory defenses, and thus constrict the protection available to
investors under federal securities laws compared with the pre-existing common law, would be inconsistent with the Congressional purpose to expand
the basis for secondary liability.
A few courts that have considered respondeat superior claims have
shared the SEC's view after reviewing the legislative history of the controlling person provisions. 9 Other courts, relying apparently on the

to hold a brokerage firm liable for the conduct of its registered representative occurring
after the representative left the employment of the firm. Id. at 394-95.
See also Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 560-61 (1st Cir. 1978); Kravitz v. Pressman,
Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Mass. 1978); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,
737-39 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
" See, e.g., Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, amicus curiae, Sharp
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981) (private damage action), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 938 (1982); Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975) (injunctive action); In re Armstrong, Jones &
Co., 43 SEC 888 (1968) (broker-dealer administrative proceeding), affd, Armstrong, Jones
& Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.) (broker-dealer administrative proceeding), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 958 (1970). A commentator has suggested that the entire controversy over respondeat
superior can be traced back to a brief filed by the SEC as amicus curiaein Paul H. Aschkar
& Co. v. Kamen & Co., cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968). See Duggan, The Brooding Omnipresence of the Federal Common Law: The Eviscerationof the Controlling PersonProvisions
of the Federal Securities Acts, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 472, 476 n.23 (1981).
' See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, amicus curiae,Sharp v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
" Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commercial Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir.
1980); SEC v. Management Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975); Johns Hopkins Univ.
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remedial purposes of the securities laws as well as the practical consequences, have rejected a result in which the controlling persons provisions would shield employers from the responsibility they otherwise would
bear for the acts of employees committed within the scope of their
employment."0
Of those courts which have recognized liability based on respondeat
superior, only the Second Circuit seems to have had a difficult time in
reaching the conclusion. Early decisions in that circuit appeared to reject
the liability of respondeat superior under the securities laws.7'1 More recently, however, in SEC v. Management Dynamics Inc.,72 the Second Circuit held that section 20(a) was not intended to supplant the application
of agency principles in securities cases, and found a corporation liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior for the actions of a principal executive
officer using corporate facilities to create a misleading appearance of activity in a certain stock. Nevertheless, the court expressly stated that
it offered no view as to cases involving minor employees, claims for
damages, or respondeat superior7that might be broader than the apparent
authority involved in that case. 1
In SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., the Second Circuit reaffirmed that
a brokerage firm could be liable for an employee's actions under respondeat
superior. The Second Circuit declined to enjoin the firm involved in that
case after finding that the firm had exercised reasonable supervision over
its registered representative, that the registered representative had made
no special use of his connection with the firm, and that the firm had derived
only ordinary commissions from the registered representative's activities.
The court refused to extend its holding beyond the present factual situation and stated that any cases that may fall between Management
75
Dynamics and Geon Industries would have to await future resolution.
Most recently, in MarburyManagementInc. v. Kohn,7' 6 the Second Circuit reviewed this history as well as the case law of the other circuits.
In Kohn, which involved alleged misrepresentations by a trainee at a
brokerage house regarding his status, the court remanded the case for
consideration of the liability of the firm as a controlling person undr section 20(a) and as a principal under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1212-13 (D. Md. 1968), afd in part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d
1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
,' See Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d at 712.
7 See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc); Gordon v. Burr,
366 F. Supp. 156, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aJfd in part, rev'd in part, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085
(2d Cir. 1974); Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970); see also SEC v. Lum's
Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
7'515 F.2d 801, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1975).
71Id.

at 813.

531 F.2d 39, 54-56 (2d Cir. 1976).
71 Id. at 55-56.
71 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
74
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The court suggested that the concern is simply with scope or course of
employment and whether the acts of the employee fairly can be considered
to be within the scope of his employment.77 The court also noted that the
good faith defense afforded by section 20(a) is not available on respondeat
superior claims. 8
Summarizing its position on respondeat superior, the court stated quite
broadly that no reason exists for believing that Congress intended section 20(a) to narrow the remedies of the customers of brokerage houses
or to create a novel defense in cases otherwise governed by traditional
agency principles.' The Kohn court noted that section 28(a) specifically
prescribes that rights and remedies provided by the 1934 Act shall be
in addition to any and all rights and remedies that may exist at law or
in equity. Furthermore, section 16 of the 1933 Act similarly provides that
the rights and remedies of the 1933 Act are additional to pre-existing
remedies. 0
D. Ninth Circuit View: Securities Law Supersedes
Common Law
The Ninth Circuit, which has suggested it was the first circuit to address the issue, has adopted the rule that section 20(a) supplants vicarious
liability of an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In Zweig
v. Hearst Corp.,8 the court relied on Kamen & Co. v. PaulH. Aschkar
& Co.,82 the purported forerunner of cases on this issue, as controlling
authority for this proposition. Unfortunately, however, the Kamen case
did not discuss explicitly respondeat superior as a basis for liability under
the securities laws.' Furthermore, while the Ninth Circuit has continued
to adhere to its view on the exclusivity of the remedy afforded by section
20(a), none of its decisions has discussed the reasoning underlying this
view."
The Third Circuit, while ostensibly following the minority rather than
the majority view, has in reality adopted a novel, intermediate position.
For example, in Rochez BrothersInc. v. Rhoades,85 the court reviewed the
legislative history of the controlling person provisions and concluded that
the use of respondeat superior for imposing secondary liability would not
advance the legislative purpose of the 1934 Act and in fact, would under" Id. at 716.
78 Id.
79 Id.

8 Id.
81 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
82 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
1 See, e.g., Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980).
8 See Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); Douglas v.
Glenn E. Hinton Inv., Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971); see also Hecht v. Harris, Upham
& Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
1 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976).
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mine the congressional intent by emasculating section 20(a). 8 Accordingly,
the court adopted the rule that respondeat superior is not applicable to
determine secondary liability in a securities case. In dictum, however, the
court distinguished the situation in Rochez, in which the court found the
corporation was not liable for the activities of corporate officers dealing
in corporate stock for themselves and their own account, from the type
of relationship that prevails in the broker-dealer cases where a stringent
duty to supervise employees does exist. This duty, the court noted, is
imposed to protect the investing public and make brokers
aware of the
7
special responsibility they owe to their customers.
In Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,8 8 the Third Circuit reaffirmed the
general rule that respondent superior is inapplicable to securities law cases.
The court seized, however, upon the "broker-dealer exception" provided
in the Rochez case, and applied it to an accounting firm. Following Rochez,
therefore, the Third Circuit held the firm liable under respondent superior
for misleading opinion letters issued in the firm's securities sales program.
In reaching its decision, the court looked to the case law in other circuits.
The court interpreted the Second Circuit's decision in Marbury Management as analogous to its own. The court noted that previous Second Circuit decisions had declined to apply respondeat superior in other contexts,
and felt that the operative factor in Marbury Management was that it
involved a brokerage firm. The court stated that the implied reasoning
in Marbury Management that brokers have a higher public duty under
securities laws than do other persons, leads to the imposition of a duty
to exercise a high standard of supervision. This duty is enforceable through
imposition of secondary liability based on respondeat superior. 9
The court read the case law of the other circuits from a similarly narrow perspective, noting that respondeat superior had been applied in cases
involving high-level officers or directors, brokerage firms, or both. The
court found these decisions consistent with its own, noting that many of
these cases emphasized the inescapable public trust placed in the firms
involved and the corresponding duty to supervise. The court found the
same type of stringent duty to supervise in the case before it because
Coopers & Lybrand had put itself in a position in which the investing
public would place their trust and confidence.
Finally, the court suggested that the policy of protection of investors,
which is the primary purpose of the securities laws, supported its decision. The court reasoned that respondeat superior must be applicable when
a firm's public representations are designed to influence investors, otherwise, the firm could insulate itself from liability by construing a "Chinese
wall" between employees and partners, depriving investors of the benefit
Id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
Id. at 182.
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of the greater expertise of these partners. However, in view of the many
other important services which accounting firms perform, the court emphasized the limited scope of its holding.
The full reach of the exception to the rule that respondeat superior
does not apply to securities cases in the Third Circuit is difficult to assess.
In Rochez, the court found that Congress intended section 20(a) to be the
exclusive means of imposing secondary liability. In Sharp, however, the
same court emphasized strongly that the doctrine of respondeat superior,
though applicable in Sharp, should not be expanded widely in the area
of federal securities regulation." Nonetheless, the court did expand its
previous broker-dealer exception to another type of firm that the court
found occupied a position of public trust. Significantly, the court also noted
that application of the doctrine of respondent superior was not necessary
to find a corporation liable for the actions of high level employees, because
their action on behalf of the corporations would create primary liability
on its part." One commentator has suggested that, for all practical purposes, the Third Circuit's exception has become the rule.2
III.

AIDING AND ABETTING

Another basis on which secondary liability has been imposed for violations of the securities laws on persons other than the primary actor is
the theory of aiding and abetting. Two provisions of the securities laws
expressly authorize actions based on an aiding and abetting theory,93
however, the majority of cases employing this theory have arisen under
other sections of the laws that do not address specifically the question.'
The Supreme Court explicitly has reserved the question of the viability

" Id. at 183.
" Id. at 182, n.8.
"See Note, Vicarious Liability: RespondeatSuperiorApplicable in CasesInvolving High
FiduciaryDuties Despite ControllingPersons Provision of Securities Exchange Act-Sharp
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), 12 SETON HALL 353, 366-67 (1982).
" See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 S 15(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C. S 77a-77bbbb (1976)
(authorizing SEC to sanction broker-dealers for willful aiding or abetting of securities law
violations); Investment Advisors Act of 1940 S 209(e), 15 U.S.C. S 80b-9(e) (1976) (authorizing
SEC to bring action in federal court against any person aiding or abetting violation of Act);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976) (imposing criminal liability for aiding and abetting commission of offense against United States).
In 1959, the SEC recommended that Congress amend the 1933 and 1934 Acts to
include a provision expressly making it unlawful for any person to aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, or procure any violation of those acts. See HearingsBefore a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,86th Cong., 1st Sess. 275-76 (1959); Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
93, 103 (1959). Congress did not adopt this amendment, regarding the amendment as an
unnecessary codification of existing law. See S. REP. No. 1757,86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960);
see also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 677-80 (N.D. Ind.
1966), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
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of aiding and abetting under the securities laws. 5 The doctrine, however,
has a long history in the lower courts. The courts apparently have assumed, albeit without discussion in most cases, that the securities laws
were not intended to displace the aiding and abetting doctrine. In fact,
no lower court has rejected the applicability of aiding and abetting to
the securities laws, and the doctrine may be so well entrenched that the
Supreme Court may be reluctant to overturn such settled precedent. In
determining the elements of secondary liability for aiding and abetting
under the securities laws, the courts have looked to common-law tort and
criminal law concepts of aiding and abetting. Based on these principles,
the courts generally require proof of three elements to establish liability.
The first requirement is that another party has committed a securities
law violation. Second, the accused party must have had a general
awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper.
Third, the accused party must have assisted the violation knowingly and
substantially." Some courts state the elements somewhat differently, but
the distinctions in phraseology do not appear to affect their analysis regard95See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-92 n.7 (1976). The Supreme Court
in Ernst & Ernst noted that the Court need not consider whether civil liability for aiding
and abetting is appropriate under the section in light of the Court's holding that an intent
to decieve, manipulate, or defraud is required for civil liability under 5 10b-5. Id. In a recent
case before the Court involving a finding of aiding and abetting liability, the Court observed
that it had reserved this issue. However, the Court referred in the same footnote to its
holding in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), that
participants in a conspiracy who violate a provision of the Commodity Exchange Act analogous
to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act can be held liable for damages. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct. 683, 686 n.5 (1983).
" But see Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 673, 678 (N.D.
Ind. 1066) (statute must be applied flexibly to implement statute's policies and purposes
in absence of clear legislative expression to contrary), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
',Courts have looked for guidance to the Restatement of Torts, S 876(b), which provides that a person is liable for harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct
of another if he "knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself:' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF ToRTs § 876(b) (1977). Reference also has been made to 18 U.S.C. S 2, which
imposes criminal liability for aiding and abetting, and to a description of aiding and abetting in the criminal context cited in Nye & Nissan v. United States. See 336 U.S. 613, 619
(1949) (quoting UnitedStates v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1983)); see, eg., Woodward
v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 n. 23 (5th Cir. 1975); Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
486 F.2d 139, 162-64 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). See also JACOBS, THE
IMPACT OF RULE 10(bY5, S 40.02 nn.1-5 and accompanying text.
"' See supranote 97. This statement of the elements of liability appears to have originated in SEC v. Coffey. See 493 F-2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975). A number of circuits have adopted this language. See e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, 700
F.2d 774, (1st Cir. 1983); Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168-78 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380, 1387-88 (10th Cir. 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ing the substance of these requirements.9 Notwithstanding the formulation, however, the exact content of the two key elements remains elusive.
Difficulty exists in drawing any clear conclusions from the varying
statements that courts have made regarding the degree of awareness and
degree of assistance on the part of the defendant required for liability.
The Second Circuit recently noted that little has been added to Judge
Hand's statement, made in a criminal context, that to be held as an aider
and abettor, a person must "in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about,
that he seek by his action to make it succeed. '0 0
While each of the two requirements generally receives separate
analysis, courts increasingly have tended to view these requirements as
interrelated. 1 1 In the frequently cited case, Woodward v. Metro Bank,"°2
the Fifth Circuit stressed the need to consider all the circumstances in
determining the liability of an alleged aider and abettor, including the
ordinariness of the transaction, the nature of the security involved, and
any special duties imposed by law on the parties." The court suggested
that the evidence of knowledge and substantial assistance must be weighed
together, indicating that a greater degree of knowledge is necessary to
satisfy the scienter requirement when the alleged aider and abettor's activity is more remote. 04
A.

Mental State Should Be Essential to Aiding and
Abetting Liability

Of the two requirements, the general awareness or knowledge requirement is the more crucial element. Many courts have noted that important
policy considerations make knowledge a critical element of proof.11 Most

" In a decision preceding the Coffey case by a year, the Third Circuit had stated that
an independent wrong must exist for aiding and abetting liability. The aider or abettor
must know of that wrong's existence and substantial assistance must be given in effecting
that wrong. See Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d at 162-63. Some courts have
adopted this language without distinguishing it from that in Coffey. See, e.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1981); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980);
see also Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779-81 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying
the Coffey formulation). Only the Fifth Circuit appears to have considered the differences
in language, adopting the Coffey formulation as the more precise. See Woodward v. Metro
Bank, 522 F.2d at 94-95.
10 IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Peoni, 100
F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)).
"I See, e.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d at 922 (individual parts of three-part test not
considered in isolation, but rather in relation to one another, especially elements of scienter
and substantial assistance); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 922 (three requirements cannot
be considered in isolation from one another).
10 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
103 Id.
104 Id.
at 95.
s See Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
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securities transactions require the mechanical assistance of a large number
of collateral participants in the usual and customary course of business.
Proof of some degree of knowledge of the wrongdoing serves to distinguish
participants in the wrongdoing from others innocently engaged in the ordinary course of business. Without this element, banks, brokers, clearing
agents, transfer agents and other such participants in the process could
become virtual insurers of their customers against securities law violations.
Accordingly, courts have said that the aider and abettor must have
knowledge of the illegal conduct of the primary violator, not just of the
material facts constituting the illegal conduct."0 Consistent with this view,
courts have held that scienter has not been established in the context
of a disclosure violation in which the aider and abettor had a reasonable
belief that all facts had been fully disclosed. ' The application of this principle, however, is complicated by many unresolved questions among the
courts regarding the nature and degree of knowledge required for liability and the extent to which the requisite degree of knowledge may vary
with other circumstances of the case. This analysis is particularly difficult
in the context of aiding and abetting claims premised on inaction or minimal
assistance by the defendant. One factor complicating the analysis has been
the Supreme Court's decisions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,0 0 and Aaron
v. SEC,' 9 that proof of scienter is a necessary element of a violation of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Many courts have concluded that these decisions dictate the result that scienter must be proved as part of a secondary aiding and abetting claim, at least in connection with violations of
section 20(b). In view of the policy considerations supporting protection
of innocent parties engaged in every day business transactions, no court
is likely to impose civil liability for aiding and abetting based on ordinary
negligence alone.'

439 U.S. 930 (1978); Cumis Ins. Soc. v. E.F. Hutton, 457 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 178 n.61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 919 (1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975). See generallyRuder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law FraudCases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In
Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972).
" See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1976); Stern
v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 826-27 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
I" See, e.g., Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
101
10

425 U.S. 185 (1976).
446 U.S. 680 (1980).

110 See, e.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981) (aiding and abetting under
rule 10b-5); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (same), cert.,
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); see also Stern v. American Bankshares, 429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D.
Wis. 1977) (aiding and abetting under S 12(2) of 1933 Act).
See Cleary v. Perfectune, 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983) (policy considerations justify
requiring proof of scienter as precondition to liability for aiding and abetting violation of
§§17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act, notwithstanding that primary violation of those sections does not require proof of scienter).
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Scienter is Itl-Defined

The concept of scienter under the securities laws remains ill-defined.'
Several courts have held that scienter in an aiding and abetting case can
be established by proof of recklessness, at least in a case in which the
alleged aider and abettor owed a duty to the plaintiff."' Of course, the
conduct that constitutes recklessness also is subject to tests of varying
stringency. Probably, no court would hold that scienter requires proof
in every case of actual personal knowledge of all the material facts of
the violation.
In construing the knowledge/scienter requirement, some courts have
charted new ground, at least in cases arising under provisions of the
securities laws other than section 10(b). These courts have focused on the
concept of a general awareness of wrongdoing, which describes a mental
state involving more than negligence but possibly less than the most
stringent test of scienter. 4 Further, at least one court has suggested that
distinctions in the mental state required for liability may have continued
vitality depending on the type of relief sought."5
C. Conduct of Aider and Abettor Must Be More Than Ministerial
Judicial construction of the knowing and substantial assistance requirement also has created certain ambiguities. The case law generally indicates
that the aider and abettor's conduct must be more than ministerial and
must be a substantial factor in the accomplishment of the primary violation when a claim is predicated on affirmative conduct by the alleged aider
and abettor. The conduct, however, need not be so important that the
undertaking -ould not have succeeded without it."' This standard clearly
"12
See infra text accompanying

notes 113-15. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme

Court used the term scienter to refer to a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud, and found that S 10(b) of the 1934 Act was intended to proscribe
knowing or intentional misconduct. 425 U.S. at 193-99. The Court reserved the question
of whether in some circumstances reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under
S 10(b). 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
11 See Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d at 783; IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d Cir.
1980); Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 528, 537 (D.
Md. 1978); Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. at 835.
" See Investors Research v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.) (alleged aiding and abetting
under S 17(e)(1) of Investment Company Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); Decker v.
SEC, 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980) (same). The Decker court noted that the Investors Research
case as originally filed used the term "scienter" in discussing the state of mind element.
However, to avoid confusion stemming from the limited definition given the term "scienter"
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder the Investors Research court replaced every reference to
"scienter" with terms such as "state of mind" or "awareness of wrongdoing." The Decker
court used similar language in its opinion. 631 F.2d at 1387 n.13.
"I See Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d at 177-78. But see Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680 (1980).
"I See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 925 (participation of underwriter defendants not
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will be met as the defendant's conduct approaches a primary violation
of the securities laws by, for example, participating in the drafting of
misleading filings or soliciting approval for the issuance of municipal
bonds.'17 However, the application of this requirement in which the defendant's conduct is less direct can be more difficult. The courts have provided
few helpful guidelines for determining when participation in a business
venture constitutes substantial assistance to another party's illegal
conduct.
In determining the sufficiency of particular conduct, the Third Circuit has looked to the Restatement of Torts which suggests the relevance
of four factors. The first factor is the amount of assistance given by the
defendant. Second, the Third Circuit looks to the defendant's presence
or absence at the time of the tort. The third factor is the defendant's
relation to the other person and, fourth, is the defendant's state of mind."8
The Second Circuit has noted that substantial assistance might include
repeating misrepresentations or aiding in their preparation by acting as
conduits to accumulate or distribute securities, by executing transactions
or investing proceeds, or by financing transactions."9 The court, however,
has stressed that such conduct must be a proximate cause of the violation."
For example, the Second Circuit has found the requisite causation when
a broker repeatedly reassured an investor of his investment adviser's competence, processed many of the relevant securities orders, and either
recklessly failed to learn of, or failed to disclose, the adviser's fraudulent
mismanagement of the investor's portfolio.'2'
Under certain circumstances, courts have found inaction by a defendant
to constitute substantial assistance. Typically, however, when a claim is
predicated on the inaction or silence of the alleged aider and abettor, the
courts have tried to employ a sliding scale approach and look for proof
of a higher degree of scienter. Probably, no court would impose liability
on a defendant whose conduct consisted of nothing more than inaction."'
"substantial assistance" in ordinary meaning and underwriting could have proceeded with
other in their place).
117See SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 226-27 (6th Cir. 1982); SEC
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 72-73 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
,, Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 163 (3d Cir. 1973) (referring to RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
5 436), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); see Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d
793, 800 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
"' Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d at 48 (citing 2A BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAw § 8.5 (1974)). See Cumis Ins. Soc'y v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 457 F. Supp. 1380, 1386
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
'" Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1983); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells
Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. aenied,444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
121 Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d at 48.
"2 See Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d at 800; Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d
279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971) (rule lOb-5 does not impose liability on anyone whose conduct consists solely of inaction).

1028

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1007

Some courts, however, have stated that secondary liability may be based
on inaction or silence when the alleged aider and abettor consciously intended to forward the violation." In what is frequently cited as the leading
case on inaction, Brennan v. Midwestern Life Insurance Co.,124 a dealer
in Midwestern stock committed securities law violations of which
Midwestern was aware and that had the effect of increasing the value
of the stock, thereby benefitting Midwestern in its merger negotiations
with another company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a finding that
Midwestern was liable as an aider and abettor, by virtue of Midwestern's
acquiesence in the fraudulent conduct in combination with certain minimal
affirmative acts. The Second Circuit has interpreted this case to permit
liability for inaction when clear evidence exists of the required degree
of scienter and a conscious and specific motivation for inaction on the part
of an entity with a direct involvement in the transaction. 25
D.

"Special Relationship"

Brennan also has been cited as support for the principle that liability
for inaction can be imposed only when a special relationship exists between
the parties, since Midwestern had failed to disclose what it knew about
the broker's fraud even though customers of the broker had made inquiries
to Midwestern." Several courts have stated that aider and abettor liability
also may be predicated on inaction when the defendant had an independent duty to act or to disclose." This duty to the plaintiff might derive
from statutory or common law but does not arise simply by virtue of participation in the proscribed conduct. 28 The imposition of liability will depend upon the relationship between the defendant's conduct and mental
state. The Second Circuit has stated that inaction, when a duty to act
exists, can create liability only when a conscious or reckless violation of
that duty exists. 29 Several courts have stated that when a special duty of
disclosure exists, liability for inaction should be possible upon proof of

12 Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d at 800; SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304,

1317 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1976); see Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. at 536 (liability for inaction may be imposed where
conscious intent to aid violation, failure to act due to improper motive, or breach of duty).
124 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
125 IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 927. The Third Circuit has suggested that when the
alleged aider and abettor through has inaction derives benefits from the wrongdoing, the
requirement of scienter may be less strict than actual knowledge of the wrong. See Walck
v. American Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778, 791 n.18 (3d Cir. 1982).
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d at 161-62.
12 IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 925-27; Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th
Cir. 1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d at 161; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir.
1973); SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 52 (7th Cir. 1972); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D. D.C. 1978).
12 Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. at 826.
12 IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 927 (2d Cir. 1980).
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a degree of scienter less than that of the high conscious intent type. 3 '
When liability is to be based on the combination of inaction or silence
and some affirmative acts, the balance may shift slighty. 3'
IV.

SECONDARY LIABILITY IN

SEC

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Under section 15(b) of the 1934 Act, the SEC has broad authority to
discipline both brokerage firms and persons who act on their behalf, following appropriate administrative proceedings. 3 ' Of particular relevance, the
SEC is authorized to sanction a firm based upon willful violations of the
securities laws by the firm's employees. Alternatively, pursuant to provisions added in 1964, the SEC is authorized to sanction a firm based upon
the willful aiding and abetting of securities violations by employees or
based upon an employee's failure to exercise due care in supervision. Read
literally, these grounds for imposing sanctions on a firm appear broader,
in many respects, than the bases on which secondary liability has been
imposed in civil actions. The statute, however, provides that the SEC shall
impose a sanction only if the sanction is in the public interest. 3' While
the term evades a precise definition,"u the requirement that the SEC make
a public interest finding may have the effect of conforming the operation
of those provisions to generally accepted principles of liability. While little case law exists in this area, and the legal analysis found in SEC administrative decisions tends to be somewhat vague, analysis of the issues
presented by these provisions adds an important dimension to the consideration of the problems involved in the imposition of secondary liability.
Section 15(b)(4) authorizes the SEC to sanction a brokerage firm if
the SEC finds that the sanction is in the public interest, and that the
firm or any person associated with the firm has engaged in certain types
of conduct or has been the subject of certain findings specified in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of that provision." A parallel provision, section 15(b)(6), authorizes the SEC to sanction directly an associated person
who has engaged in the specified types of conduct or has been the subject

'" Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 97. Some courts have said that a recklessness
standard is appropriate in such cases. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982),

rev'd on other grounds, 51 U.S.L.W. 5123 (U.S. July 1, 1983); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells
Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d at 484-85 (2d Cir. 1979); Cumis Ins. Soc'y v. E.F. Hutton, Co., 457 F. Supp. at 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
131 See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 97 (in case combining silencelinaction
with affirmative assistance, degree of knowledge required should depend on how ordinary
assisting activity is in the business involved).
"115 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1976). The SEC has substantially identical authority to discipline
municipal securities dealers, investment advisers, and their "associated persons." See

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 S 15B(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78111 (1976): Investment Advisors Act of 1940 % 23(e), 202(aX17), 15 U.S.C. S 80b-9(e) (1976).
' See 15 U.S.C. S 78o(b)(4) (1976).
13 See 2 L. Loss. SECURITIES REGULATION 1323 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969).
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b}(4).
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of the specified findings.'38 For purposes of these provisions, an "associated
person" is defined to include not only a partner, officer, director, branch
manager, or employee, but also any person controlled by the firm." Among
the specified bases for imposing sanctions, the conduct described in subparagraphs (D) and (E) is more relevant to this discussion.
Subparagraph (D) of section 15(b)(4) permits the SEC to impose sanctions on a firm if the firm or an associated person of the firm willfully
has violated any provision of the securities laws. 38 This provision provides a direct statutory basis for holding a brokerage firm responsible
for any securities law violations of its employees, even if not committed
within the scope of his employment. Subparagraph (D) also may go beyond
the traditional respondeat superior doctrine and include other principles
of agency law by making the firm responsible for the acts of any other
person controlled by the firm. Under this provision, it would be possible
to sanction a firm for an employee's violations even when the firm was
blameless, if the sanction served some other public interest. Nevertheless,
sanctions generally have not been imposed on a firm in the absence of
some degree of fault by the firm.
Prior to the Securities Acts Amendment of 1964,"'l under the similar
provisions of section 15(b),"' history of administrative decisions exists that,
while not explicitly mentioning the doctrine of respondeat superior, makes
reference to the principle that the wrongdoing of the employee may be
attributed to the firm."' For example, in In re Sutro Brothers & Co.,'
the SEC stated that a registrant as a firm can act only through its

" Id. S 78o(b)(6) (1976).
13

Id.

13

See supra note 133. The use of the term "willfully' in this context generally means

only intentionally committing the act which constitutes the violation, and does not denote
actual knowledge of a violation or scienter. See, e.g., Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965).
139 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 6, 78 Stat. 571-72.
As relevant herein, the 1964 amendments generally authorized the SEC to discipline individuals as well as firms who violate the securities laws, expanded the range of sanctions
to include censure and suspension in addition to revocation of a firm's registration, added
violations of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 and the Investment Act of 1940 as grounds for discipline, and added a new provision
making the willful aiding or abetting or the failure adequately to supervise grounds for
discipline. See S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1963).
Prior to the amendment of S 15 in 1964, S 15(b) provided that the SEC could revoke
the registration of a broker or dealer if the SEC found that revocation was in the public
interest and that the firm or any partner, branch manager, or controlling or controlled
person of the firm, willfully had violated any provision of the 1933 or 1934 Act or rules
thereunder.
...
See supra note 139.
14 See, e.g., In re Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 470, 479 (1963)
(Commission also relied
on the statutory provisions authorizing discipline of firm based on willful violations of its
employees in finding violation); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); In
re E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 379 (1945).
142

41 S.E.C. 470 (1963).

1983l

DERIVATIVE LIABILITY

employees and agents. The court noted that the willful violations of a firm's
employees in the course of employment must be considered the willful
violations of the firm."' In In re Sutro Brothers & Co., however, the sanction was imposed on other grounds.144
As an extension of this analysis, a line of authority also has developed
that justified the imposition of a sanction on a firm based on the firm's
failure to supervise its employees properly. In In re Bond & Goodwin,
Inc., 45 the SEC was concerned that a firm would attempt to shield itself
from the consequences of an employee's undetected violations by pleading
the very conditions which made the violations possible. The court held,
therefore, that a firm cannot point to the officer's ignorance of the actual
violations to insulate the firm from the consequences of such actions. 46
The SEC relied on the holding in In re Bond & Goodwin, Inc. in In
re Reynolds & Co., 47 and noted that brokers and dealers are under a duty
4
to supervise the actions of employees."
In In re Reynolds & Co., the SEC
held that when the failure of a securities firm to maintain and diligently
enforce a proper system of supervisions results in the perpetration of fraud
upon customers, or in other misconduct in willful violation of the Securities
and Exchange Act, such failure constitutes participation. The court stated
further that these willful violations may be committed not only by the
person who performed the misconduct, but also by those who did not prop4
erly perform their duty to prevent the misconduct."
Since the adoption of section 15(b)(4)(G) in 1964, section 15(b)(4)(D) has
been used to discipline firms for violations of associated persons mainly
in cases involving primary violations committed by high-level officers or
controlling persons of the firm. 11
The adoption of section 15(b)(4)(E) had the effect of codifying and expanding the SEC's authority to discipline brokerage firms and their
associated persons. Subparagraph (E) of section 15(b)(4) authorizes the SEC

"3Id. at 479.
See id. at 481. Notwithstanding the SEC's discussion of other violations attributed
to the firm, the basis for the sanction imposed apparently was laxity in office procedures
and supervision and a failure to make proper inquiry and investigation regarding the proper

registration of certain stock. Id.
15 15 S.E.C. 584 (1944).
" See id. at 601.
"3 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960).
"' See id. at 916. The SEC cited its prior decisions. Id.; see also In re Bond & Goodwin,
Inc., 15 S.E.C. 584 (1944); In re E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945); In re Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559 (1945); In re R.H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955), affd,
231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956). The SEC also pointed to New
York Stock Exchange and NASD rules imposing similar obligations. See 39 S.E.C. at 916.
" In re Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. at 917. The SEC found that certain individual super-

visory personnel had violated or aided and abetted the firm's violation. Id.

15 See In re Quinn & Co., 44 S.E.C. 461 (1971); In re Jaffee & Co., 44 S.E.C. 285 (1970)
(sanction of firm set aside for future to give adequate notice of derivative basis of alleged
liability), orderaffjd in part,vacated in part,Jaffee & Co. v. SEC, 446 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1971).
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to sanction a firm if the SEC finds the sanction to be in the public interest, and if the SEC finds that the firm or an associated person willfully
has aided or abetted a violation of the securities laws or has failed to
supervise reasonably another person who commits such a violation. 51 The
statute provides a defense to discipline based on a failure to supervise
if appropriate supervisory procedures and systems exist, if the supervisor
involved has discharged reasonably his duties under those procedures and
systems, and if the supervisor has no reasonable cause to believe that
the procedures were not being complied with. The SEC also can sanction
the associated person directly under section 15(b)(6).
The adoption of this provision had been proposed by the SEC in
response to a recommendation by the Special Study of the Securities
Markets that broker-dealer supervision over their sales personnel should
be strengthened. 5' The Senate report to accompany the Senate version
of the bill notes that the SEC consistently had held that partners, branch
managers and other supervisory personnel have a responsibility to supervise employees and that sanctions may be imposed on a firm with
employees who fail to meet this obligation." The report explains that
the primary purpose of permitting failure to supervise as an additional
ground of disciplinary action would be to enable the Commission to reach
more directly supervisory personnel who fail to discharge their
responsibilities."
Although concern was expressed at Congressional hearings leading
to the adoption of the 1964 amendments that the addition of this remedy
might cause the SEC to stop naming firms in cases involving failure to
supervise, the Chairman of the SEC testified that the SEC would proceed solely against individuals only in the relatively unusual case in which
no administrative sanction against the firm is warranted. 5 He gave as
examples of such a situation, a salesman who, despite proper safeguards
and controls, embezzles money or other property from his firm, and a
salesman who commits a private securities fraud unrelated to his firm's
business.'56
The Senate report asserts the the new subparagraph (E) would not
limit the existing power of the Commission to discipline a broker or dealer
firm for any violations by a person associated with such broker or dealer."
While some evidence exists that Congress was aware of the SEC's reliance
See supra note 6.
See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, Part
1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 328 (1963).
10 S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1963).
154 Id.
1 Investor Protection,1963-64: Hearingson H.R. 6789, H.R. 6798, S. 1642 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st and
2d Sess. 1219 (1964) (statement of SEC Chairman William L. Cary).
"5
"

156Id.

"I S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1963).
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on respondeat superior in section 15(b)(4) proceedings,158 some ambiguity
remains as to whether the failure to supervise provisions of subparagraph
(E) were intended to supersede the application of respondeat superior in
order to render firms liable for their own failure to supervise their
employees. Stated another way, the question is whether Congress intended
to provide brokerage firms with a reasonable care defense against sanctions based on their failure to supervise.
The policies underlying the doctrine of respondeat superior suggest
a substantial argument against this construction of section 15(b)(4)(E). 1 9
Section 15(b)(4)(E) was intended primarily to permit the SEC to reach individuals, rather than firms, with supervisory responsibilities through section 15(b)(6). The reasonable care defense was provided to prevent these
individuals from being held as "absolute guarantors" of their supervisees'
conduct.' While the limitation makes sense when applied in favor of a
supervisory employee, the limitation is far less appropriate when applied
in favor of the firm. The supervisory employee's responsibility is only
to supervise, and his liability should be limited to his failure to perform
this obligation reasonably. In contrast, the firm provides its sales personnel
and other supervised employees with their positions and the authority
to act for the firm, holds them out as competent and honest advisers, and
obtains the main benefits of their services. For these reasons, the common law has held employers responsible for unlawful acts growing out
of the employment relationship. 61
The one case to address this issue held that section 15(b)(4)(E) does
not displace the doctrine of respondeat superior. In Armstrong, Jones &
Co. v. SEC,"2 the Sixth Circuit noted that the longstanding position of
the SEC had been to sanction broker-dealers under respondeat superior.
11 See Technical Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on H.R. 6789,
H.R. 6793, and S. 1642; Investor Protection:Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interstate andForeign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 211, 226 (1963). The
Senate report statement that subparagraph (E would not limit the existing power of the
SEC was adopted verbatim from the "technical statement" in proposed legislation submitted by the SEC to the Congress. Id. An earlier version of the SEC's analysis had stated
that S 15(b)(4)(E) would not limit the existing power of the Commission to discipline a broker
or dealer firm for a violation by an associated person under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. See Technical Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Relating to
S. 1642, SEC Legislation1963: HearingsBefore a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 352, 363, 364 (1963). The deletion of this language
suggests an intention, of which Congress presumably was aware, to assure the continued
viability of respondeat superior as well as any other available theories of secondary liabil-

ity. In addition, the SEC's decision in Sutro Brothers, was announced less than one week
after the SEC had submitted a draft of its proposed S 15(b)(4)(E).
"19See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
,€ S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 44 (1963).
" But see S. REP. No. 379,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1963) (Commission can take disciplinary
action only against entire firm which may result in unfair application or no disciplinary
action at all).
1" 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
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Although Congress enacted an additional provision giving the Commission
the power to impose a sanction on a broker-dealer for failure to supervise
its employees adequately, the Sixth Circuit observed that this provision
does not limit the Commission's power to discipline a broker-dealer for
its employee's acts."
In practice, the distinction between the statutory failure to supervise
theory and the doctrine of respondeat superior is not relevant when the
firm arguably had met its duty to supervise reasonably.
In SEC v. Geon Industries, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of an injunction against a brokerage firm on a theory of
respondeat superior."4 The court upheld the district court's conclusion
that the firm had been innocent of even a negligent failure to supervise.
The court also noted that the firm's salesman had made no special use
of his connection with the firm and that the firm had obtained no profit
from the wrongdoing other than ordinary commissions. Further, the firm
had offered rescission to affected investors. Weighing the firm's conduct
against what the court saw as the hardship associated with an injunction
against the firm, the court held that an injunction in this case would not
further the policies of the securities act.'65 The court noted in a footnote, however, that the SEC long has applied respondeat superior in its
administrative proceedings even in the absence of any finding of inadequate supervision, but the court declined to pass on the SEC's authority
to do so.166 Nevertheless, the court distinguished SEC proceedings from
injunctive actions by noting the wide latitude in the sanctions the SEC
can impose, including the option to impose no sanction at all when the
circumstances warrant. 7 While the SEC recently has sought to impose
a sanction on a firm in administrative proceedings based on a respondeat
superior theory in which no finding of inadequate supervision or other
culpable conduct was made, this case may raise questions about the propriety of imposing a sanction in such a case.
The language of section 15(b)(4)(E) also leaves unresolved questions
about the intended relationship .between that provision and other preexisting theories of secondary liability. For example, some ambiguity exists
about whether that provision's aiding and abetting language was intended
to incorporate the evolving standards of aiding and abetting liability in
16

See id. at 359. The Ninth Circuit has cited Armstrong with disapproval in rejecting

respondeat superior in a private damage action. See Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129,
1132 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
"I See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976). The court noted that the
firm's salesman had made no special use of his connection with the firm, the firm had obtained no profit from the wrongdoing other than ordinary commissions, and the firm had
offered rescission to affected investors. 531 F.2d at 54-55. Of course, such factors relating
to the participation or good of the firm are not strictly relevant to traditional respondeat
superior analysis.
161 See supra note 164.
1
531 F2d at 55, n.21.
167
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civil securities law actions. As previously indicated, courts recently have
required proof of a state-of-mind element greater than negligence before
'
imposing liability for aiding and abetting. 68
The legislative history,
however, suggests that Congress intended liability under this statutory
provision to be governed by a negligence standard. The Senate report
to accompany the 1964 amendments indicate that a person should not be
deemed willfully to have aided or abetted under this section if he did not
know or have reasonable cause to know, of the acts, omissions, scheme,
or plan of the primary securities law violator.1 69 Noting that the SEC had
held, in a number of cases, that an individual participated in violations
by a broker or dealer as an aider or abettor, the report asserts that section 15(b)(4)(E) would codify this practice and clarify the basis for it."' The
standard which the SEC has applied under section 15(b)(4)(E) is difficult
to discern.'
Finally, whether section 15(b)(4)(E)'s failure to supervise provisions
would preclude the applicability of the controlling person provisions of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts to section 15(b)(4) proceedings is not clear. These
provisions could encompass a range of defendants beyond the direct supervisors, but might require proof of greater culpability than does the
statutory basis of the reasonable failure to supervise standard. Admittedly, no known judicial or administrative decisions exist that address
the applicability of the controlling person provisions to any section 15(b)
proceedings, and the SEC may not be inclined to base its determinations
on these provisions in view of their good faith defenses. However, to the
extent that the requirement of a public interest finding was intended to
assure that the interpretation of the provisions of section 15(bX4) are consistent with accepted notions of liability, an argument exists that, even
if findings of violations are made, a sanction should not be imposed if a
good faith defense would have been available under the controlling person provisions.

'

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1963).

170Id.
171 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Rel.
No. 19070 (Sept. 21, 1982), 26 SEC Docket 254 (report pursuant to S 21(a) of the 1934 Act)
(implying that in some circumstances brokerage firm may have duty of inquiry when executing orders in advised accounts, and that continued execution of orders when firm has
"knowledge" of improprieties may result in liability for aiding and abetting). The courts
are likely to apply the judicially evolved standard. See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824.
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